Ending the war "as soon as possible" will only help if Ukraine wins decisively. Minsk III would leave a Damoclean sword hanging over Ukrainian civil society, which would cause even more refugees. A partition along the Dnieper (thankfully unrealistic at this point of time) would permanently displace a large part of the country's population, even if Western Ukraine can improve its standing to Eastern EU levels. (Remember Vietnam?) No one in Eastern Europe trusts Putin's guarantees any more, and it is only reasonable to expect him to repeat a winning formula, so even some Eastern EU countries would lose their best and brightest.
The cynic in me will notice that Western countries like Germany and Britain probably *want* more Eastern EU immigration even if they cannot quite find the words for this desire. But narrowing one's realm of influence (and free movement even) further and further is not a good long-term strategy.
I'm not convinced that "Ukraine", by which I mean the people currently living there who aren't sympathetic to Russia, will be better off if the war carries on for another year. Territory is irrelevant if most of the talented people have left. Here's what I wrote about a possible peace deal back in August: https://dailysceptic.org/2022/08/31/what-a-peace-deal-for-ukraine-might-look-like/
The "possible peace deal" ignores the pattern of foreign adventures that Putin embarks on whenever he feels a need to strengthen his standing within Russian society. After Georgia and Ukraine (along with failed attempts at stirring up trouble in Kazakhstan and the Baltics), it is illogical to expect that Donbas and Crimea will mark the end of his border-pushing. It is more likely that he will either have a go at further pieces of Ukraine or try the Baltics next. In either case, the refugee crisis will become chronic (who wants to live in a country that could be at war tomorrow?) and we might have a direct NATO-Russia hot war on our hands (not to mention China getting itchy fingers).
If you're right and he's motivated entirely by the "need to strengthen his standing within Russian society", then even if he's pushed all the way back to the February 23rd borders, he will just try again.
Of course, I disagree that he's motivated entirely by that need. You're no doubt familiar with William Burns' 2008 memo to Condoleezza Rice:
"Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.”
Feb 10, 2023·edited Feb 10, 2023Liked by Noah Carl
The Russian opposition has moved a long way from 2008 (a year that probably marked the climax of its jingoistic tendencies). Back then, Russia was looking like a country on the rise (economically and, one would think, politically), and the war with Georgia was an easy victory; why not play superpower in such a situation? Right now, Russia is falling into recession, its army is bleeding fire- and manpower, and mobilization is hanging over half the population as a Damoclean sword. Unsurprisingly, "cleaning our house" has taken over the oppositional agenda. Will it revert to imperialism if the weather gets better? I don't think so; Russia is huge, fertility is down, and climate change might make significant swaths of the country more hospitable. The only way I can see externally aggressive nationalism reemerge in Russia is under outside pressure, either military from China or legal from the West. I do think the West needs to make sure that Russia's loss isn't more hurtful to its population than Putin's continued rule (essentially avoiding Versailles, so keep the reparations to the oligarchs), but that's about as much as needs to be done. Leave it to Bellingcat to worry about teens with swastika tattoos; those will not be the ones deciding Russian foreign policy after the current regime croaks.
And yes, Putin needs to go, one way or another. Any truce requires either some amount of trust or the total annihilation of the military potential of one side. Trust is impossible with Putin after 20 years of lies.
> So Ukrainian refugees are more than twice as well-educated as the population at large, despite having a similar age structure.
This is slightly ironic in light of the fact that surveys also suggest that willingness to fight Russia until the recovery of all territories (pre-22/2/22) tracks education.
Anyhow, not much to disagree with here, it tracks my own analysis. Post-war backflow will be balanced by men reuniting with wives in the EU. Ironically, virtually regardless of what happens militarily, Russia will further improve its demographic preponderance over Ukraine (this may or may not be relevant so far as the future is concerned; depends on the political and security reconfigurations that accompany the war's end). The one thing Ukraine does have have going for it is that any "Malorossiyan" or "pluralist" identity, as opposed to "monist" Ukrainianism, already very enervated prior to the war, will end forever. Whether the frontlines end up, there's just be Russians and Ukrainians to the east and west of them, respectively.
Ending the war "as soon as possible" will only help if Ukraine wins decisively. Minsk III would leave a Damoclean sword hanging over Ukrainian civil society, which would cause even more refugees. A partition along the Dnieper (thankfully unrealistic at this point of time) would permanently displace a large part of the country's population, even if Western Ukraine can improve its standing to Eastern EU levels. (Remember Vietnam?) No one in Eastern Europe trusts Putin's guarantees any more, and it is only reasonable to expect him to repeat a winning formula, so even some Eastern EU countries would lose their best and brightest.
The cynic in me will notice that Western countries like Germany and Britain probably *want* more Eastern EU immigration even if they cannot quite find the words for this desire. But narrowing one's realm of influence (and free movement even) further and further is not a good long-term strategy.
I'm not convinced that "Ukraine", by which I mean the people currently living there who aren't sympathetic to Russia, will be better off if the war carries on for another year. Territory is irrelevant if most of the talented people have left. Here's what I wrote about a possible peace deal back in August: https://dailysceptic.org/2022/08/31/what-a-peace-deal-for-ukraine-might-look-like/
The "possible peace deal" ignores the pattern of foreign adventures that Putin embarks on whenever he feels a need to strengthen his standing within Russian society. After Georgia and Ukraine (along with failed attempts at stirring up trouble in Kazakhstan and the Baltics), it is illogical to expect that Donbas and Crimea will mark the end of his border-pushing. It is more likely that he will either have a go at further pieces of Ukraine or try the Baltics next. In either case, the refugee crisis will become chronic (who wants to live in a country that could be at war tomorrow?) and we might have a direct NATO-Russia hot war on our hands (not to mention China getting itchy fingers).
If you're right and he's motivated entirely by the "need to strengthen his standing within Russian society", then even if he's pushed all the way back to the February 23rd borders, he will just try again.
Of course, I disagree that he's motivated entirely by that need. You're no doubt familiar with William Burns' 2008 memo to Condoleezza Rice:
"Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.”
The Russian opposition has moved a long way from 2008 (a year that probably marked the climax of its jingoistic tendencies). Back then, Russia was looking like a country on the rise (economically and, one would think, politically), and the war with Georgia was an easy victory; why not play superpower in such a situation? Right now, Russia is falling into recession, its army is bleeding fire- and manpower, and mobilization is hanging over half the population as a Damoclean sword. Unsurprisingly, "cleaning our house" has taken over the oppositional agenda. Will it revert to imperialism if the weather gets better? I don't think so; Russia is huge, fertility is down, and climate change might make significant swaths of the country more hospitable. The only way I can see externally aggressive nationalism reemerge in Russia is under outside pressure, either military from China or legal from the West. I do think the West needs to make sure that Russia's loss isn't more hurtful to its population than Putin's continued rule (essentially avoiding Versailles, so keep the reparations to the oligarchs), but that's about as much as needs to be done. Leave it to Bellingcat to worry about teens with swastika tattoos; those will not be the ones deciding Russian foreign policy after the current regime croaks.
And yes, Putin needs to go, one way or another. Any truce requires either some amount of trust or the total annihilation of the military potential of one side. Trust is impossible with Putin after 20 years of lies.
> So Ukrainian refugees are more than twice as well-educated as the population at large, despite having a similar age structure.
This is slightly ironic in light of the fact that surveys also suggest that willingness to fight Russia until the recovery of all territories (pre-22/2/22) tracks education.
Anyhow, not much to disagree with here, it tracks my own analysis. Post-war backflow will be balanced by men reuniting with wives in the EU. Ironically, virtually regardless of what happens militarily, Russia will further improve its demographic preponderance over Ukraine (this may or may not be relevant so far as the future is concerned; depends on the political and security reconfigurations that accompany the war's end). The one thing Ukraine does have have going for it is that any "Malorossiyan" or "pluralist" identity, as opposed to "monist" Ukrainianism, already very enervated prior to the war, will end forever. Whether the frontlines end up, there's just be Russians and Ukrainians to the east and west of them, respectively.